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BOOK REVIEWS
ON THE TEACHING OF LAW nT THE LIBERAL ARTS CURBICULmM.

By Harold J. Berman.' Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1956.
Pp. 179. In November, 1954, a conference was called to explore
the possibilities and to assay the intellectual gains which conceivably might accrue from teaching law in the liberal arts
curriculum. The conference met at Harvard Law School and
was financed by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The
participants made up a roster of lawyers and the academic elite
in the teaching of law and political science. Included were McGeorge Bundy, Thomas H. Eliot, Mark DeW. Howe, Archibald
MacLeish, Talcott Parsons, and Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. Members of the conference were concerned with objectives of teaching
law to college undergraduates and graduate students in the
arts and sciences, appropriate content and teaching methods for
courses in law in the liberal arts, and the problems associated
with introducing law courses into present curricula - indeed, a
formidable list of topics.
Friendly but exacting scrutiny is needed here. In looking over
this monograph, one wonders if a committee of physicians from
the medical schools will one day make a similar overture to the
liberal arts colleges. Few would question either the merits or
power of many of the arguments well stated in this report by
those who see compelling reasons for the introduction of law to
the liberal arts curriculum. But the limits of time, human energy
and physical facilities preclude teaching vast areas of demonstrably useful and enlightening subject matter; rigorous selection
must perforce be made. Already the college curriculum is a
veritable chaos of requirements and electives, an 'unmeaning
profusion of subjects.' A plethora of individually worthwhile
courses surely leads to confusion and redundancy. The intellectually liberating virtues of each ingredient are tirelessly extolled by
academic protagonists, although to the rank and file student they
are viewed superfically and almost excusively as vocational
preparation. However, the liberal arts curriculum remains shorn
of its liberal arts objectives. Instructors imbue their special fields
with quasi-magical properties which, by a complicated alchemy,
will produce ideal citizens from students dutifully exposed to
the beneficent rays of history, government, the classics and, yes,
the law. In the welter and turmoil of teaching and learning
neither faculty member nor student has much opportunity
1 Professor of Law, Harvard University.
(747)
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simply 'to stand and stare,' to reflect profoundly and comprehensively upon what he had done, or to ask the question in the
Mahayana: "Where, what and who am I"?
With all our academic bustle and obsequious devotion to
truth, we fail in large measure to examine with candor and
courage the underlying assumptions upon which the several
disciplines are built. In reality, these assumptions are largely
unconscious and unformulated in our minds. We are so used to
them that it is well nigh impossible for many teachers - let
alone students - to recognize them. They have become axiomatic, second-hand and conventional. Though perhaps overstated, the remark of Sir Walter Moberly that the university
today is not asking the really fundamental questions has much
merit. As he puts it: "We have concentrated on what is of
secondary, and have neglected what is of primary, importance;
we have paid tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have
omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and
faith."2 An attitude of pervasive triviality haunts the groves
of academe; intellectual venture recedes before personal security
and status.
It is difficult to see - at least from reading this book - precisely how the study of law in the liberal arts curriculum will
significantly change this picture. One may confidently hazard
the guess that the law, like other disciplines already in the liberal
arts curriculum, would be taught as it is now widely taught, in a
pedestrian, superficial and incurious fashion. It seems that the
high ends currently envisaged by the conference and eloquently
stated in this book could conceivably be reached through a
drastic over-hauling of present teaching methods at the college
level rather than through the addition of more courses. The curriculum is sorely overloaded with academic empires. Is the law to
be the newest addition to "a narrow and arrogant departmentalism"? Dean Bundy and Thomas H. Eliot raise relevant issues
in this connection.
Much college teaching is of extremely poor quality, little more
than hackwork, another form of routine. It lacks the courage to
defy, where indicated by reasonable inquiry, common sense and
public opinion. Thus education, instead of being a tool of social
criticism, becomes an apologist for the status quo. The pivotal
problem of really educating students to the point of independent
thought will be resolved not by enlarging the curriculum, but
by bringing to bear in the classroom some of the courage of
Socrates and a heightened awareness of the responsible use of
knowledge.
2

MoaiEmy, THE: CRISIS

IN THE

UNIVmsrrY 304 (1949).
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This brief, provocative volume should provide a point of departure for searching inquiry with respect to the proposals set
forth in its pages. Herein lies its real value.
Frederick E. Ellis*

REAzY FoR m P.AnqnIF. By Melvin M. Belli.' New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1956. Pp. x, 338. $6.50. Each day, in
the factories, on the highways of the countryside, in the streets
of the cities in all manner of places and in an unbelievable
variety of situations human beings are crippled, maimed and
killed because someone was careless. The automobile which has
contributed so much to the convenience, comfort and happiness of
mankind is also an instrument of destruction because it is made
carelessly, or because both users and non-users fail to exercise
care to avoid its patent dangers. In Ready For The Plaintiff,
we are told, "one in eighteen of us will be seriously injured
before 365 days of the calendar year have passed." 2 We are told
also "In the last fifty years, one deadly weapon, the automobile,
has killed more people in the United States than we have had
fatalities on all the battlefields in all the wars this Republic has
fought since its founding nearly 180 years ago!" "These statistics
are not abstract, impersonal," says the author. "They are broken
bones jutting thru flesh. They are arteries spurting blood. They
are screams and groans of piercing agony. And any one of them
could be you."3 During 1954, 9,700,000 persons were injured and
96,000 accidentally killed. It is a fair surmise that a substantial
number of those accidents resulted in claims for the recovery of
damages. Each year brings its heavy toll of accidents and lawsuits. Personal injury and wrongful death claims represent 75%
of the lawsuits filed in the state and federal courts. So great is
the volume of this type of litigation that courts in the larger
jurisdictions of the country are sorely pressed to make reasonably prompt disposition of the cases pending on their dockets.
Representation of the victims of accidents has become big
business, offering rich rewards to lawyers who successfully
prosecute the claims of plaintiffs. Competition for this business
has produced many evils, of which the book takes cognizance.
*

Professor, College of Education, University of Minnesota.

emn]r of the California Bar and author of MoDEmN TRIALs (1954).
2 Text at 36.
3 Id. at 37.
1
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No effort is made to condone the reprehensible practices of the
ambulance chaser or the shyster lawyer, although these derelictions are dealt with more gently than the unfair practices
of representatives of defendants, against which the author repeatedly and vigorously inveighs. The book is relentless in its
condemnation of the claim agent who endeavors to settle every
case "for as little as possible" regardless of its value or merit.
Such practices are scathingly denounced as "the short-changing
of cripples" and are regarded by the author as infinitely more
reprehensible than the justly criticized efforts of plaintiffs' lawyers who attempt to secure excessive verdicts by appeals to passion and prejudice.
The author also rides to battle against those publicists who in
highly critical articles on the growing number of personal injury
suits and the increasing number of large verdicts in such cases,
have, by implication, included all lawyers for injured claimants
in the category of the ambulance chaser and the shyster. Conceding that there are some lawyers who violate the canons of ethics
and decency in their representation of injured claimants, the
author indignantly resents "the large scale libel" of the many
honest and dignified lawyers who specialize in the representation
of plaintiffs in the trial of personal injury suits. In their behalf he
cites and quotes at length from a survey of the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research of Temple University which,
among other things, reports that "all lawyers contacted in the
work seem to be dignified, with established practices and high
moral and ethical standards of procedure."Apart from its controversial aspects and partisan tone, there is
much in the book of interest to the layman. It contains a clear,
concise and altogether interesting exposition of the principles
and procedures that govern and control in the trial of lawsuits.
The author ranges over a wide field. Not only does he cover the
subjects of negligence, contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, proximate cause and the doctrine of last clear chance,
as these principles are applied in negligence cases, but he also
deals with suits for libel and slander and a great variety of
claims under the workmen's compensation laws. Potential
plaintiffs are warned against dilatoriness that would result in a
claim being unenforceable because of the running of the statute
of limitations. They are told also of the frustrating experience of
suing a physician for malpractice because of the difficulty in
obtaining expert testimony in support of an aggrieved person's
claim. But while the book is assertedly addressed to the layman, quite likely it will be most widely read by the legal pro4

Id. at 294.
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fession. Even those lawyers who violently disagree with many
of the views expressed therein will find it interesting. The book
abounds in "shop talk" and in anecdotes of the court room. The
well-told accounts of many unusual and amusing incidents
arising in the trial of cases will make the reading of the book a
pleasant experience for even the dissident barrister. Trial lawyers,
particularly the young and inexperienced, as well as law students,
will profit by reading it. The author offers the sage advice to
"never underestimate the intelligence of a jury or overestimate
its information." 5 He emphasizes the necessity of intelligent and
persistent investigation and painstaking preparation as the essential ingredients of success in the trial of cases. In stressing the
need for thorough investigation of the facts, Mr. Belli does more
than merely sermonize; he demonstrates the value of unremitting effort to ascertain the facts by reference to actual cases
in which imaginative and persistent investigation resulted in the
discovery of facts which insured the success of litigation.
Like many other successful advocates, the author is a strong
believer in the efficacy of demonstrative evidence. He writes well
and at times, brilliantly; but it is not unfair to say that he attempts to cover too much ground. As a successful trial lawyer and
author of several other books dealing with the subject of personal injury litigation, he writes with a confidence born of success
in both fields of endeavor. Ready For The Plaintiff is not a great
book, but it is an interesting and provocative work well worth
reading.
Charles J. McNamee*

LAN FisK_ SToNE: PILLAR OF THE LAW. By Alpheus Thomas
Mason.' New York: The Viking Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 914. $8.75.
The author has attempted to duplicate his earlier and impressive
work on the life of Justice Brandeis in this biography of another
pillar of the law, Harlan Fiske Stone. However, in the reviewer's
opinion, he has not succeeded. Mr. Mason, nevertheless, has
provided us with a competent, if not compelling, work which
constitutes required reading for the lawyer and for close observers of the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, in
5 Id. at 251.
* District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio.
1 McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
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the commentator's opinion, this book should leave its mark as a
contribution to the source materials available to students and
historians of the law and contemporary American political history, rather than as an imposing biographical work.
In further excuse of what the reviewer considers Mr. Mason's
failure to put together a really outstanding biography, the author
would be entitled to plead certain limitations of his subject matter
as being responsible, rather than deficiencies of his own style,
research or scholarship. Harlan Fiske Stone was a very great
and good man; nevertheless, it is the very reasonableness of his
nature which makes it difficult for any biographer to portray him
as a hero, crusader or villain without which dramatic trappings
most biographies almost unavoidably lapse into a tedium which
does not make for inspired writing or easy and long remembered
reading. Brandeis was a crusader, Holmes a patriarch of the law
and a pariah of philosophy, Marshall a constitutional innovator,
and Hugo Black a controversial public figure. The biographers of
these men had material much more adaptable for inspired
biographies in the grand tradition of American historical-biographical writing than Mr. Mason had at his command when he
wrote his book.
However, to say that Harlan Fiske Stone was not one of the
dramatic figures of American constitutional history is not, in the
least, to suggest that he did not have an enviable public career
and contribute significantly to the development of American
life and law. Any man who had the honor of serving at various
stages of his career, as dean of the Columbia Law School, partner
in a distinguished New York law firm, Attorney-General of the
United States, Associate Justice and then Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, quite obviously enjoyed
unique opportunities to leave the imprint of his philosophy on
the times which knew him. Harlan Fiske Stone did not fail in
this respect. He used his opportunities of public service, as
teacher, dean, lawyer and judge to advance both his profession
and the body of legal principles and rules which comprise
American public law in the direction of fuller realization of the
twin goals of democracy, i.e., security within the bounds of
liberty. And if Stone had to choose between the two, the history
of his public career makes it quite clear that his preference
would be on the side of liberty.
Harlan Fiske Stone was an intellectual. About that there can
be little doubt. Despite sharing the distaste of his friend, Judge
Learned Hand, for some of the young, less humble, intellectuals
of the New Deal, the fllii aurorae as he called them, it is quite
clear that Stone viewed the law, as an arm of philosophy and
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as an intellectual process. His public and private utterances as
well as his judicial opinions, almost without exception, confirm
this judgment of the man. However, while Stone was entitled to
regard intellectuality as a moving force in his nature, he was
equally justified in laying claim to other strains of human
character which served him almost as well in making him the
man he was and explaining his commendable contributions to the
development of American legal institutions. Stone was a Yankee.
He had deep roots in a New England Puritan past and family
tradition. Not only did such a genealogy assist in constituting
him as one who entertained considerable reverence for American
traditions and the Anglo-Saxon basis of our law, but also, perhaps, explains why he remained always a cautious and practical
fellow, given to extended and weighty deliberation before acting
in any direction, whether in deciding a case or taking some action
with respect to the political arena or in regard to the affairs and
administration of the law school which he served so well as dean.
Finally, Justice Stone, on most occasions, demonstrated that
straightforwardness of inquiry and response which our New
England friends somewhat immodestly like to consider as the
exclusive trademark of their region and their people.
Throughout his book the author exploits the rugged virtues
that undoubtedly were those of the man about whom he writes.
He does this well. Unfortunately, he has done this too effectively,
to the point where they seem, on occasion, overdrawn. However,
the instances or opportunities of heroic action in the life of Harlan
Fiske Stone are overshadowed by the undramatic, recurrent consistency of his capable and workmanlike performance at the bar
and on the highest bench. It is because of this, the reviewer believes, that Mr. Mason's treatise unavoidably takes on a pedestrian cast in which dramatic and decisive incidents and moments
in the life of the man about whom it is written furnish comparatively short hiatuses in the otherwise measured but monotonous procession of tasks well, but not inspirationally, executed.
There is another trait manifested by Harlan Fiske Stone in
his public life developed at considerable length by the author.
Stone, despite his integrity, his courage, and determination of
character, was frequently indecisive and as a consequence often
seemed to give the appearance of playing both sides of the philosophical and political fences. For instance, he could never quite
make up his mind whether he wanted the Court "packed" as
President Roosevelt proposed, or whether it was better to endure
the judicial obstinacy of his brethren in the majority who seemed
intent on demonstrating that the Constitution was no longer a
workable charter of government. His wavering between the
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liberal and conservative points of view is most charitably explained, perhaps, by the very reasonableness of the man; he was
able to see good in most men and in most philosophies. Accordingly, he could be vigorous in his condemnation of the moribund
views and Toryrhetoric of his colleagues of the bench and bar
during the late twenties and in the early thirties as the shadows
of an approaching depression gave way to the stark realities of
an economic collapse. On the other hand, he was quite sincerely
shocked by the radicalism and lack of concern for stare decisis that
his new colleague, Hugo Black, demonstrated in his brutally
candid dissents during the latter's early period of service in the
Supreme Court. And from its first days, Stone could complain
in private of the "grave faults of the Roosevelt administration...
its lack of financial foresight and its reckless disregard for the
most elementary points of justice in dealing with grave public
problems." No New Dealer was Harlan Fiske Stone. While he
put the imprimatur of constitutional approval on most of Roosevelt's works, there can be no doubt he remained to the last a
Yankee, an ardent admirer of Herbert Hoover, and a conservative
in philosophy, if not in judicial deed and utterance.
However, it is clear that the philosophical conservatism of
Justice Stone led him in the end to the same place where Holmes'
philosophical skepticism took the Great Dissenter. As Stone put
it, he knew, only too well through personal experience, that the
"courts are not the only agencies of government capable of governing." With Holmes, he agreed on the necessity of social and
economic experimentation within the broad bounds of the purposefully general, almost platitudinous, principles of the Constitution. Stone, however, did disagree with Holmes concerning
the basis which underlay their common conclusion regarding
the wisdom and the efficacy of judicial self-restraint in passing
upon the constitutionality of legislative enactments. Holmes
surely would say concerning social and economic experiments undertaken by the body politic that "they can't do it, but let them
try." Stone would rather reply that "they should not do it, but
judges are not the ones to oppose."
Stone's willingness "to give opportunity for play of the joints"
in the constitutional process by sustaining the constitutionality
of legislative attempts to meet economic and social problems of
the times without repudiating the traditions of the past or imparing the principles of the Constitution entitle him to be known
as a judge who, while taking cognizance of the past, looked
to the future, and thus kept attuned to the present. This judgment of the man is best supported, perhaps, by referring to his
famous footnote in his opinion in United States v. Carolene Prod-
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ucts Co.2 That now classic summary of why personal rights
occupy a higher echelon in the scheme of our Constitutional
values than do mere property rights is a penetrating revelation of
Stone's understanding of the essence of our democratic government. He knew that unless the rights of the minority were protected in the areas of free speech, freedom of religion and free
exercise of the franchise, we would have repudiated the basis or
assumption on which a democracy rests, i.e., political truth will
be fashioned in and evolve out of the free interplay and clash of
competing ideas and philosophies. If this assumption is adhered to,
then courts are correct in exercising an attitude of restraint when
passing upon the constitutionality of legislative enactments; but
if legislators, conversely, attempt to impair the basic tenet of
democrary by fettering the rights of minorities to compete in.
or contribute to the contest of ideas and philosophies, then the
Court should be vigilant in striking down such attempts.
However, when we turn to those aspects of Stone's career not
directly concerned with his judicial philosophy and the opinions
he composed, the record is not quite so commendable, although
far above the average. As Chief Justice, for instance, he was
much too tolerant of his temperamental and egocentric colleagues.
Seriatim opinions, both dissenting, concurring, and dissenting in
part and concurring in part, became the order of the day. The
judicial feuds that burned within and the personal animosities
that pervaded the august inner sanctum of the conference room
of the Supreme Court of the United States became material for
the political and popular commentators of the times. As a result,
the justices who had done most to redeem the Supreme Court as
a working instrument of effective government, taking its proper
place in our constitutional sphere by not exceeding the authority
which the founding fathers intended it to exercise, were the same
men who brought the Court into popular disrepute as an institution and as a symbol of government entitled to the respect
and admiration of the citizenry, whatever the comments of the
political smart-alecs. Yet Stone labored to keep the Court removed from the political battles which raged around it. He did
yeoman service in resisting President Roosevelt's attempts to appoint members of the Supreme Court to a second portfolio in
the government, whether it be a rubber czar or head of a Pearl
Harbor investigation. While he did not entirely succeed in these
efforts, Stone must be commended for such resistance, for unless
the Court remains (and equally important, gives the appearance
of remaining) detached from and impervious to the pressures or
2

304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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pleasures of either the executive and legislative branches of the
government, a serious fissure in our constitutional structure will
be the unfortunate result.
In conclusion, the reviewer would like to say that Mr. Mason's
biography of Harlan Fiske Stone is indeed an authoritative work.
However, authority usually is disposed to reveal itself in dull,
flat tones. Order and continuity are so often its hallmarks. These
also are both the vices and the virtues of this book. If one can
survive the tedium of perusing it from cover to cover he will be
rewarded, if not enriched, intellectually. One final word, however,
.as a further encomium of the author's effort. Mr. Mason has
spurned in his book the temptation to suppress the few traces
of clay which appear in the feet of his hero. A recent biographer
-of another Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the predecessor of Chief Justice Stone, could have emulated Mr. Mason's candor in this regard. Actually, it is when the
author is developing or exploiting the weaknesses of Justice
Stone's character that the subject matter best catches his read,er's attention and invokes more interest and understanding. In
that connection, Stone's private complaints to a Washington
columnist about what he regarded as the less than adequate
abilities and judicial temperament of one of his younger brethren,
which were later revealed in public press, supply one of the more
interesting tales in the book. If the author had done more in this
respect it is quite possible that the final production would have
been a livelier and more stimulating work. On the other hand,
if this had been attempted it probably would have resulted in a
less accurate biography of Harlan Fiske Stone, for the latter
'was undoubtedly the original, reasonable, likeable, admirable,
hardworking man, despite the fact that his career would never
entitle him either to be known as a crusading fighter in the war
-of constitutional ideas or as a shirking scoundrel in that conflict.
As a lawyer the reviewer perhaps may not be unbiased in this
next criticism. The book seems to suffer, as do most books about
lawyers which are written by political scientists, from the author's
less than clear perception of the cases he attempts to analyze
throughout the book. This deficiency is not so apparent when the
-decisions under discussion are concerned with constitutional
questions. In the rarified atmosphere of constitutional law the
political scientist, in the main, survives quite well. However when
he turns his hand to the more mundane fields of the law, such
as conflicts of law, commercial law, statutory interpretation and
above all, federal procedure-or as professionals like to call them,
"lawyers law" - the political scientist is woefully deficient in
the equipment with which he tackles a difficult job. The reviewer
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is sorry to say Mr. Mason has proved no
However, we are grateful for what he has
lingering regrets we may entertain as to
have embellished or adorned the fare a bit

exception to the rule.
provided us, whatever
whether he might not
more.
Alfred L. Scanlan*

* Member of the bars of the District of Columbia, Alabama, and
Maryland.
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ACCOUNTING
BASIC ACCOUNTING AND COST ACCOUNTING. By Eugene L. Grant.

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. Pp. v, 623. $6.50. Basic accounting principles and cost accounting procedures are discussed, the work being designed primarily to familiarize the
layman with good accounting practices.
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Mason. New York: The Viking Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 914. $8.75.
BAR. By Chester Harris. New York: Vantage press,
1956. Pp. 452. $3.95. A dramatic and highly interesting biographical sketch depicting the courtroom tactics and finesse
of famed criminal lawyer Charles Joseph Margiotti.

TIGER AT THE

COURTS
By Bernard Schwartz. New York: Ronald
Press, 1957. Pp. vii, 429. $6.50. In light of the vast changes that
have occurred within our governmental policy during the last
quarter-century, this book analyses Supreme Court decisions
in the areas where the opinions of the Court are most noticeably felt.

THE SUPREME COURT.

ESTATE PLANNING
To MAKE WILLs. By Bertel M. Sparks. New York:
New York University Press, 1956. Pp. 230. $5.00. This text
treats of the appropriateness of the contract to make a will
in the field of estate planning, and presents a guide to those
lawyers who find it convenient to employ this device.

CONTRACTS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
By Harry B. Ellis. New York: Ronald
Press, 1956. Pp. vi, 311. $5.00. A portrait of Arab people based
upon personal experiences of the author, coupled with detailed
explanations of the factors which signify the importance of the
Middle East in the international picture.
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ON THE NATURE OF MAN. By Dagobert D. Runes. New York:

Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 105. $3.00. A searching and
challenging insight into the thinking process of man, presenting the author's definition as to human morality.
LEGAL EDUCATION
*ON

THE TEACHING OF LAW IN THE LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM.

By Harold J. Berman. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1956.
Pp. 179. Price unlisted.
LITERARY PROPERTY
By Philip Wittenberg. New
York: World Publishing Co., 1957. Pp. 284. $5.00. An exposition of the law of literary property, severed from technical legal jargon, it guides authors and publishers about the
various media of communication.

THE LAW OF LITERARY PROPERTY.

PERSONAL INJURY
By Melvin M. Belli. New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1956. Pp. x, 338. $6.50.

*READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

POLITICS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY UNDER PREssuRE. By Donald C. Blaisdell.

New York: Ronald Press, 1957, Pp. v, 324. $5.00. The author
sets forth an explanation of the effects of pressure politics on
the traditional liberties of our American heritage.
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